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Acknowledgments

This paper was prepared for the Korea Labor Institute seminar on “Welfare States’ Response to
Appelbaum, Dean Baker, Nicole Woo, and seminar participants for their helpful comments; the
Korea Labor Institute for their hospitality; the Ford Foundation and the Public Welfare Foundation
for financial support of CEPR’s labor-market research; the Russell Sage Foundation for its support
of the research summarized in Low-Wage Work in the Wealthy World (Russell Sage Foundation, 2010);
and Alexandra Mitukiewicz for assistance with the data.
Introduction

Over the last two decades, high – and, in some countries, rising – rates of low-wage work have emerged as a major political concern. According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), in 2009, about one-fourth of U.S. workers were in low-wage jobs, defined as earning less than two-thirds of the national median hourly wage (see Figure 1). About one-fifth of workers in the United Kingdom, Canada, Ireland, and Germany were receiving low wages by the same definition. In all but a handful of the rich OECD countries, more than 10 percent of the workforce was in a low-wage job.

FIGURE 1
Share of Employees in Low-wage Work, 2009

Source: OECD (2011) and Mason and Salverda (2010); data for Belgium, France, Italy, Portugal, and Spain refer to 2008; data for France and Netherlands refer to 2005.

If low-wage jobs act as a stepping stone to higher-paying work, then even a relatively high share of low-wage work may not be a serious social problem. If, however, as appears to be the case in much of the wealthy world, low-wage work is a persistent and recurring state for many workers, then low-wages may contribute to broader income and wealth inequality and constitute a threat to social cohesion.

This report draws five lessons on low-wage work from the recent experiences of the United States and other rich economies in the OECD.1

1 In what follows, to maximize economic comparability, and for reasons of data availability, the paper focuses on the OECD countries excluding the emerging and eastern European countries, Iceland and Luxembourg, and Sweden and Switzerland (for which the OECD does not have recent data on the prevalence of low-wage work).
Lesson 1: Economic Growth is not a Solution to the Problem of Low-wage Work

Countries do not appear to “outgrow” low-wage work. Higher levels of GDP per capita, for example, are not associated with a reduction in the share of low-wage workers. As Figure 2 demonstrates, there is no relationship between the level of per capita GDP and the low-wage share. Nor is rapid growth associated with a shrinking low-wage share. As Figure 3 shows, the relationship between real growth in a country’s GDP per capita over the period 1980-2010 is not meaningfully related to a country’s low-wage share in 2009.

FIGURE 2
Low-wage Work and GDP Per Capita

Source: Analysis of OECD (2011) and Mason and Salverda (2010).
Lesson 2: More “Inclusive” Labor-market Institutions Lead to Lower Levels of Low-wage Work

As Appelbaum and her colleagues have argued, “...the most important influence on the observed differences in low-wage work is the ‘inclusiveness’ of a country’s labor-market institutions.”² In their view, “inclusive” labor-market institutions “have formal – and sometimes informal – mechanisms to extend the wages, benefits, and working conditions negotiated by workers in industries and occupations with strong bargaining power to workers in industries and occupations with less bargaining power.”

The most obvious of the inclusive labor-market institutions is collective bargaining. Figure 4 shows a strong relationship in our sample between collective-bargaining coverage and low-wage work.

Collective bargaining, however, is not the only “inclusive” labor-market institution. Other important inclusive institutions include minimum wages, employment-protection legislation, the enforcement of national labor laws, and the benefit systems for the jobless and low-income households.³ Figure 5, for example, demonstrates that higher shares of GDP devoted to public social expenditures are also strongly associated with lower shares of low-wage employment. More generous social expenditures may reduce low pay by forcing employers to raise wages to compete with social benefits. Or the social expenditure effect may simply reflect the high correlation between social expenditures and union power, with union power acting to increase social expenditure and decrease the low-wage share through extending collective-bargaining coverage to otherwise low-wage workers.

³ See Bosch, Mayhew, and Gautié (2010).
Lesson 3: The United States is a Poor Model for Combating Low-wage Work

The United States has the highest share of low-wage work in the OECD countries analyzed here. Moreover, the incidence of low-wage work in the United States has been rising for at least three decades, from just over 20 percent in 1979 to just under 30 percent in 2010 (see Figure 6). This
performance makes the United States a poor model for those seeking to reduce low-wage work. The U.S. experience, however, may still offer some lessons in the negative.

**FIGURE 6**  
**Employees Earning less than Two-thirds of the Median Wage, U.S.**

![Graph showing employees earning less than two-thirds of the median wage from 1979 to 2009.](image)

Source: Author's analysis of CEPR CPS ORG extract.

The United States has two principal policies designed to address the problem of low wages: the minimum wage and the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). The U.S. experience with each of these policy tools provides some specific lessons.

**Lesson 3A: The U.S. Minimum Wage is Set Too Low to Reduce the Share of Low-wage Work**

In principle, the minimum wage can have an important impact on the share of low-wage work. A minimum wage set at or near the threshold for low-wage work (two-thirds of the median hourly wage) can substantially reduce the incidence of low pay. In France in the mid-2000s, for example, the minimum wage was set near the country’s low-wage threshold and that country had among the lowest levels of low-wage work in the OECD. The implementation of the national minimum wage in the United Kingdom in 1999 may have contributed to the leveling off in the 2000s of the low-wage share, which had been rising almost continuously from the end of the 1970s.

The United States has had a federal minimum wage since the Great Depression. Over the last three decades, however, the minimum wage in the United States has been set at a level that is well below the threshold for low-wage work (Figure 7). As a result, the federal minimum wage has had little or no impact on the share of the workforce experiencing low pay by the standard definition.

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4 The United States has a host of other policies, from education and training to Medicaid and food and housing subsidies, that have an impact on low-wage work. For a helpful, recent overview of social policy programs in the United States, see Scholz (2010).

5 See Figure 1 and Bosch, Mayhew, and Gautié (2010), Table 3.5.

6 See Mason and Salverda (2010), Figure 2.1 and Bosch, Mayhew, and Gautié (2010), Table 3.5.
Starting in the late 1980s, as the real value of the federal minimum wage fell far below its historical levels, many states began to set state-specific wage floors above the federal minimum. In 2011, 17 states had state-level minimum wages above the federal minimum wage. The highest of these, however, were still about 20 percent below the low-wage threshold and therefore likely had only a limited impact on these states’ low-wage share.

**Lesson 3B: The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) has Contradictory Effects on the Volume of Low-wage Work and on the Well-being of Low-wage Workers**

Since 1975, the United States has had an Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) that effectively tops up the earnings of some low-wage workers in lower-income families. The program began modestly, but has grown to be the largest program providing financial assistance to low-wage workers and their families. In 2009, over 27 million families received $60 billion in tax credits through the EITC (Figure 8).

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9 For recent reviews of the EITC program, see Athreya, Reilly, and Simpson (2010), Eissa and Hoynes (2011), Holt (2006), and Wicks-Lim and Thompson (2010).
The structure of the EITC is complex, but thanks largely to the relative generosity of offered benefits and to the administration of the program through the income tax system, the take-up rate is high. The value of the EITC’s refundable tax credit varies according to a worker’s family income and size. In 2008, the maximum benefit per family was about $4,800 per year for a family with two or more children and a maximum income of about $39,000 per year.\(^{10}\) The benefit levels, however, vary substantially across family types. In the same year, the maximum EITC payment for a single person with no children, for example, was under $500 on a maximum eligible income of just under $13,000 per year.\(^{11}\)

In practice, it is difficult to estimate the impact of the EITC on the wage structure. The EITC is not a direct subsidy to the wages of low-wage workers because its value depends on both the worker’s family size and the income received by other adults in the family. For single workers with no children, the EITC has little effect on hourly earnings. For example, a single, childless, full-time, full-year worker earning the federal minimum wage in 2008 would have earned about $12,280 before the EITC – an average of $6.14 per hour.\(^{12}\) If eligible for the maximum EITC, this same worker would have seen his or her annual earnings rise to about $12,720. This translates to about $6.36 per hour, or an EITC top-up of about $0.22 per hour, leaving this worker still only about half way to the low-wage threshold in 2008. To further complicate the calculations, if the same childless worker were in a family with another worker who earned more than about $1,000 per year, neither worker would be eligible for any EITC payment because they would exceed the family income limit for a childless family.

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\(^{10}\) The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 temporarily raised the generosity of the EITC. The maximum benefit rose to over $5,500 and the maximum eligible family income increased to almost $50,000. See Athreya, Reilly, and Simpson (2010) for details.

\(^{11}\) Athreya, Reilly, and Simpson (2010), Table 2.

\(^{12}\) The federal minimum wage was $5.85 for the first seven months of 2008 and $6.55 per hour for the last five months. The calculations here assume that the worker earned the weighted average of these two rates for 2,000 hours in that year.
The EITC has the greatest impact on the earnings of low-wage, single parents with children. Eissa and Hoyynes estimate that in 2004, the EITC raised the hourly earnings of a single, full-time, full-year minimum-wage worker with two children by about $1.90 per hour (relative to a minimum wage of $5.15 per hour in that year), and the wages of a similar worker with only one child by about $1.30 per hour. In either case, the combination of the minimum wage and the EITC would still leave this worker below the low-wage threshold in that year.

The EITC may also have a perverse impact on the wages of workers who do not qualify for the program. Since the EITC significantly raises the after-tax wages of many eligible low-wage workers, the EITC effectively raises the labor supply for eligible workers, which may act to lower the before-tax wages paid by employers. The EITC more than compensates recipients for any decline in the wage employers paid, but a large share of low-wage workers, especially those without children or in families with other adults in work, experience only the supply-induced reduction in the hourly wage because they are not eligible for the EITC (or receive much smaller payments). Rothstein estimates that the net result of these gains and losses for different types of workers is that an additional dollar spent on the EITC only raises after-tax wages by about 73 cents. Leigh concludes that “a ten percent increase in the generosity of the EITC is associated with a five percent fall in the wages of high school dropouts and a two percent fall in the wages of those with only a high school diploma.”

Many states operate their own state-level EITC programs that supplement the benefits paid by the federal EITC. In 2010, 24 states had EITC programs, usually linked explicitly to the federal EITC. The generosity of these programs ranged from 3.5 percent (Louisiana) to 45 percent (Minnesota) of the federal EITC.

The state programs, which are modeled closely on the federal EITC, reproduce the strengths and weaknesses of the federal EITC. The state EITCs raise the after-tax wage of eligible workers, sometimes considerably, but do so in a way that has a complicated impact on the after-tax wage structure. The EITC increases earnings of low-wage, low-income single parents substantially. But, the program has little direct impact on the wages of low-wage, even low-income, workers with no children, and likely a negative impact, through supply effects, on these same low-wage workers.

Taken together, the minimum wage and the EITC could act as an effective tool to combat low-wage work in the United States. The EITC could substantially raise the after-tax hourly wage of eligible workers, without any negative impact on the employment prospects of low-wage workers. The minimum wage, meanwhile, could put a floor on the wages of workers ineligible for the EITC and limit the ability of employers to capture an important share of the total tax expenditure. In practice,

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13 Eissa and Hoyynes (2005), Figure 3.
15 Rothstein (2010).
16 Leigh (2010).
18 Low-wage workers may be in low-, middle-, or high-income families; low-income families rarely have high-wage members.
19 See Wicks-Lim and Thompson (2010) and (OECD) 2009.
20 The OECD (2009) agrees: “minimum wages can increase the effectiveness of [in-work benefit] schemes: by providing a wage floor below which wages cannot fall, they help to achieve the intended redistribution to low-wage workers.” (p. 168)
however, the EITC and minimum wage in the United States have been set too low to limit the incidence of low pay, and the minimum wage has been set too low to prevent employers from reaping windfalls from the eligibility structure of the EITC.

Lesson 4: Low-wage Work is Not a Clear-cut Stepping Stone to Higher-wage Work

If low-wage work were a short-term state that helped connect labor-market entrants or re-entrants to longer-term, well-paid employment, high shares of low-wage work would be less of a social concern. Indeed, if low-wage work facilitated transitions from unemployment to well-paid jobs, countries might want to encourage the creation of a low-wage sector to improve workers’ welfare in the long term.21

Unfortunately, the preponderance of evidence suggests that low-wage work is a “sticky” state. Not only are low-wage workers likely to stay in low-wage jobs from one year to the next, they are also more likely than workers in higher-wage jobs to fall into unemployment or to leave the labor force altogether. From 1995 through 2001, for example, about half or more of low-wage workers in Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States remained in low-wage work from one year to the next, and between 8 and 23 percent of low-wage workers left the workforce year-to-year. Over the same period, between 25 and 41 percent of low-wage workers in these countries crossed the threshold into higher-paying jobs.22 The years 1995 to 2001 were particularly good for low-wage workers in the United States, with sustained low unemployment and the most rapid wage growth over the last three decades for workers at the bottom of the wage distribution. More recent, internationally comparable, data are not available for any of these countries, but given the general deterioration in world labor markets, these transition probabilities are likely to be lower now than they were in the boom at the end of the 1990s.

Low-wage jobs may not help, and may even hurt, the future labor-market prospects of the workers who hold them. Low-wage jobs, like spells of unemployment, may, for example, be associated with the erosion of a worker’s accumulated skills. If so, a worker’s long-term earnings potential would be enhanced more by a period of education and training than by working in a low-wage job. Low-wage employment, like an unemployment spell, may also send a signal to potential employers that a worker has low productivity, reducing the probability that the low-wage worker will move up the pay scale. Based on an analysis of data for the United Kingdom, Stewart, for example, finds that low-wage work has “almost as large an adverse effect as unemployment” on low-wage workers’ future employment prospects.23 He concludes: “not all jobs are ‘good’ jobs, in the sense of improving future prospects, and ... low-wage jobs typically do not lead on to better things.”

None of this is to suggest that economic policy should not seek to create employment opportunities for less-skilled, less-educated, or less-experienced workers. The point is that low-wage work does not appear to be a self-correcting problem.

21 For a recent discussion of low pay, including its role as a trap or a stepping stone, see Lucifora and Salverda (2009).
22 Mason and Salverda (2010) Table 2.4.
23 Stewart (2007).
Lesson 5: In the United States, Low Wages are among the Least of the Problems Facing Low-wage Workers

The intense policy focus on low pay can obscure the reality that low pay is often among the least of the labor-market problems facing low-wage workers, especially in the United States. U.S. labor law offers workers remarkably few protections. U.S. workers, for example, have the lowest level of employment security in the OECD and no legal right to paid vacations, paid sick days, or paid parental leave. The low level of union coverage in the United States means that contractual obligations generally don’t make up for the lack of legal guarantees.

In the absence of legal or contractual rights, low-wage workers are the least likely to have access to core benefits. Almost half of private-sector workers in the bottom fourth of the wage distribution in 2010, for example, had no paid vacations. In the same year, about 68 percent of private-sector workers in the bottom fourth of the wage distribution had no paid sick days, compared to only about 11 percent of workers in the top fourth. In the U.S. context, however, probably the most critical problem facing low-wage workers is the lack of access to health care. Rho and Schmitt estimate that in 2008, more than half (54 percent) of workers in the bottom wage quintile did not have employer-provided health insurance and more than one-third (37 percent) had no health insurance of any kind, private or public. The 37 percent non-coverage rate for the bottom quintile of wage earners in 2008 was up from 15 percent in 1979.

In countries with welfare-state institutions and labor laws that provide significant rights and protections to all workers regardless of their wage level, a focus on the wage problems facing low-wage workers makes sense. In a country such as the United States, however, where welfare-state institutions and labor laws offer only weak protections, low-wage workers face a host of problems beyond low wages. In the U.S. context, raising wages at the bottom would certainly help. But, raising wages alone will do little to address these same workers’ lack of access to health insurance or to alleviate the “time bind” caused by a lack of paid vacation, paid sick days, and paid family leave.

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24 See also Schmitt (2009), pp. 6-8.
25 See, for example, Schmitt (2011), Figure 6, based on OECD data.
26 See, for example, Ray and Schmitt (2007), Figure 1.
27 See, for example, Heymann, Rho, Schmitt, and Earle (2010), Figures 1 and 2.
28 See, for example, Ray, Gornick, and Schmitt (2010), Figures 1, 4, and 5.
30 Rho and Schmitt (2010), Table 5.
31 Moreover, as my colleague Dean Baker notes, giving low-wage workers the right to paid time off (vacations, holidays, sick days, and family leave, for example) would lower the total annual number of hours worked per employee and therefore would expand employment opportunities for workers at the low end of the wage distribution.
Conclusion

The experience of the last few decades suggests that we have a pretty good idea of how to reduce the size of the low-wage workforce. “Inclusive” labor-market institutions that extend the pay, benefits, and working conditions negotiated by workers with significant bargaining power to workers with less bargaining power appear to be the most effective general remedy for low-wage work. The specifics can take many forms, from extending collective bargaining agreements to cover workers who are not themselves members of unions, to setting a minimum wage at or near the threshold for low-wage work. Greater public social spending may be another way to increase the “inclusiveness” of national industrial relations systems since a generous social safety net improves the bargaining position of low-wage workers relative to their employers. The national details aside, the available cross-country data show a strong association between higher levels of inclusiveness and lower levels of low-wage work.

The United States, as one of the least “inclusive” OECD countries, primarily offers cautionary lessons when it comes to low-wage work. Union coverage rates in the United States are the lowest among comparable OECD economies, providing little in the way of protections for the large majority of low-wage workers. In principle, federal and state minimum wage laws and federal and state EITC programs could significantly lower the incidence of low-wage work. But, in practice, wage floors and EITC payments in the United States have been set too low to prevent a long-term increase in low-wage work, let alone reduce the ranks of the already sizable sector.

For some workers, low-wage work is a stepping stone to better things. For an important share of low-wage workers, however, a low-paid job is not much better than unemployment and can even harm their long-term wage and employment prospects. Policy discussions often rightly emphasize the importance of a job, any job, in the fight against poverty (particularly in contexts where national benefit systems are not generous enough to raise jobless families out of poverty). But, the relatively low levels of mobility out of low-wage work argue against seeing an expansion of low-wage employment as a straightforward solution to the problems of poverty or wage inequality.

In the United States, in particular, low wages are only the most obvious problem facing low-wage workers. In the absence of legal or contractual guarantees, low-wage workers in the United States are far less likely to have health insurance (private or public), paid sick days, paid family leave, paid vacation and holidays, and other benefits that are more routinely provided to higher-wage workers (and to low-wage workers in other rich economies). Raising wages at the bottom – without other measures to address the terms and conditions of low-wage employment – will do little or nothing to address these other pressing concerns facing low-wage workers.
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