In Fiscal Year 2001, more than 18,000 incidents of spouse abuse were reported to United States Military authorities. This represents up to five times the rate of marital aggression in the civilian community. Yet, relatively few military personnel are prosecuted or administratively sanctioned on charges stemming from domestic violence. Until recently, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has made little progress or effort to confront the problem and deal with domestic violence involving military personnel. Confronted with highly publicized instances of domestic violence, the DoD formed a multidisciplinary Defense Task Force on Domestic Violence (DTFDV) in April 2000 to investigate the protocol surrounding domestic violence and to recommend changes. The work done in the past three years by the DoD’s DTFDV takes an important first step in the war on domestic violence in the military. This article will provide an overview of the Task Force, its work during the past three years, and its recommendations.

**History of the Defense Task Force on Domestic Violence**

In 1998, a highly publicized cluster of domestic homicides occurred at Fort Campbell, Ky., a U.S. Army post. On Jan. 17, 1999, 60 Minutes, the CBS News magazine, aired a highly critical report of the military’s response to domestic violence. This report, entitled "The War at Home," increased pressure on Congressional members to investigate the nature and extent of domestic violence within the military and to take necessary steps to reduce the violence. Several national domestic violence groups diligently advocated for the establishment of an entity to investigate domestic violence within the military. As a result, Congress, led by Senator Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.), mandated the establishment of the DTFDV in October 1999 as part of the Congressional authorization for expenditures for the military in 2000.

As a result of the passage of the National Defense Authorization Act (Pub. Law 106-65, Section 591),

**ABSTRACT**

The Department of Defense has taken steps in recent years to improve outcomes for victims of domestic violence who reside on military installations. In 2000, the Defense Task Force on Domestic Violence was established, a military-civilian group of experts charged with improving the military’s effectiveness in addressing domestic violence in the Armed Forces in a variety of areas including offender accountability, coordination between military and civilian communities, and changing the military climate around domestic violence. This article will provide an overview of the Task Force, its work during the past three years, and its recommendations.

**History of the Defense Task Force on Domestic Violence**

In 1998, a highly publicized cluster of domestic homicides occurred at Fort Campbell, Ky., a U.S. Army post. On Jan. 17, 1999, 60 Minutes, the CBS News magazine, aired a highly critical report of the military’s response to domestic violence. This report, entitled “The War at Home,” increased pressure on Congressional members to investigate the nature and extent of domestic violence within the military and to take necessary steps to reduce the violence. Several national domestic violence groups diligently advocated for the establishment of an entity to investigate domestic violence within the military. As a result, Congress, led by Senator Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.), mandated the establishment of the DTFDV in October 1999 as part of the Congressional authorization for expenditures for the military in 2000.

As a result of the passage of the National Defense Authorization Act (Pub. Law 106-65, Section 591),
Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen convened the 24-member DTFDV in April 2000. The DTFDV was comprised of members from the Departments of Defense, Justice, and Health and Human Services, as well as highly regarded private-sector experts in domestic violence, including judges, advocates, law enforcement officers, and survivors of domestic violence in the military. [See Appendix A for a complete listing of DTFDV members and staff.] On April 24, 2003, the DTFDV completed its three-year mandate, having made more than 200 recommendations to the Secretary of Defense and to the United States Congress.4

Challenges Facing the DTFDV

Contrary to public perception, the military is not one monolithic structure. The DTFDV members identified a major limitation in the military’s response to domestic violence: Each branch responds differently and each installation, of which there are more than 300 around the world, may well respond differently than stated policy. One of the goals of the DTFDV’s work was to establish a consistent standard of response by adopting models and philosophical underpinnings across all branches of service.

In 1999, 81% of all military personnel (in all four military branches) were stationed in the U.S. at any given time—and 60% of those resided off the military installations.5 Because military housing is severely limited, the majority of personnel make their homes in local communities.6 Therefore, many, if not most, of the military domestic violence incidents occur in the civilian community. These cases are responded to by civilian law enforcement agencies and may be heard in civilian courts. It is also important to know that domestic violence services currently provided by the military are only available to victims of domestic violence if either the victim or the perpetrator is a member of the military and if they are married.7 As a result, domestic violence cases involving a military member who is in a dating or cohabitating relationship may only be addressed by organizations in the civilian community.8

Historically, the military approach has been one of “under the table” and “keep it quiet” when it came to dealing with service members who committed violent acts. In some communities, the modus operandi has been to avoid the criminal justice process by calling the commanding officer of the soldier, sailor, airman, or marine, and requesting that the officer pick up the offender. These practices have proved to be ineffective in dealing with domestic violence.

Summary of Recommendations

Over the course of its three years, the DTFDV made more than 200 recommendations to the Secretary of Defense in its Annual Reports.9 Listed below are nine key points summarizing these recommendations.

- Create a culture shift that:
  - Does not tolerate domestic violence,
  - Moves from victims holding offenders accountable to the system holding offenders accountable, and
  - Punishes criminal behavior;
- Establish a victim advocate program with provisions for nondisclosure;
- Implement the Proposed Intervention Process Model [see Appendix B];
- Replace the Case Review Committee (CRC) with the Domestic Violence Assessment and Intervention Team (DVAIT);
- Enhance system and command accountability and include fatality review process;
- Implement DoD-wide training and prevention programs;
- Hold offenders accountable;
- Strengthen local military and civilian community collaboration; and
- Evaluate results of domestic violence prevention and intervention efforts.

Strategic Plan

An important component of the DTFDV’s recommendations was the long-term strategic plan by which the DoD may more effectively address matters relating to domestic violence within the military. The proposed plan includes four parts:

1) The Key Points from the DTFDV Reports (listed above)
2) The Domestic Violence Intervention Process Model [see Appendix B]
3) Core Principles of Domestic Violence Intervention (see below)
4) Domestic Violence Prevention Conceptual Model [see Appendix C]
Domestic Violence Intervention Process Model

The Domestic Violence Intervention Process Model [see Appendix B] shows the interrelationships between the various elements of the military community that are involved in responding to an incident of domestic violence. It is not intended to be a flow chart. It is intended to be an optimal guideline for responding to domestic violence and includes intervention points with victims, military commanders, and offenders. One limitation of the military’s current response to domestic violence that the DTFDV identified was the inadequate criminal investigation of incidents and the command response to substantiated cases. Lack of confidence, knowledge, and training of how to investigate criminal activity, particularly crimes against women, is pervasive throughout the military and gave rise to the DTFDV developing protocols for an effective response.

The DTFDV believed that appropriate responses by victim advocates, military commanders, and law enforcement personnel were so critical that protocols were developed for each of these responders that amplify the steps outlined in this Intervention Process Model. Many lengthy discussions took place so that the full task force could understand just what impact each of the recommendations of the proposed protocols would have on each other, and necessary changes were made. Additionally, the DTFDV determined that because the most effective method of preventing offenders from committing subsequent acts of domestic violence was to hold them appropriately accountable from the very beginning, a fourth protocol for offender intervention needed to be added. The protocols provide detailed suggestions for appropriate responses. (For complete details on these protocols, visit the DTFDV Web site at: http://www.dtic.mil/domesticviolence/). "The Domestic Violence Intervention Process Model will help ensure maximum safety for victims, hold offenders appropriately accountable, and aid in achieving the ultimate goal of eliminating domestic violence from military communities."10

Core Principles of Domestic Violence Intervention

The DTFDV developed core principles it believed should guide all domestic violence intervention efforts. These principles were founded on the precept that every possible effort should be made to establish effective programs to prevent domestic violence in the military. However, if domestic violence does occur, the DoD has a duty to protect the victims and take appropriate action to hold offenders accountable. Because the military services will be implementing the recommendations, the DTFDV anticipated that challenges and variance from the original thoughts would occur in the “real world.” The Core Principles ask that, for each program designed or individual action taken, the decision-maker be able to describe how the actions are consistent with these principles. To ensure maximum effectiveness, all intervention programs should consider the extent to which an action will adhere to these Core Principles:11

- Respond to the needs of victims and provide for their safety;
- Hold offenders accountable;
- Consider multi-cultural and cross-cultural factors;
- Consider the context of the violence and provide a measured response;
- Consider military and civilian response;
- Involve victims in monitoring domestic violence services; and
- Provide early intervention.

Domestic Violence Prevention Conceptual Model

The Domestic Violence Prevention Conceptual Model [see Appendix C] was developed by the DTFDV as a graphic representation of the continuum of risk, examples of target populations, and examples of possible tools to be used to prevent domestic violence. It is not intended to be an all-inclusive list of tools, actions, and programs to prevent domestic violence, but is presented as a way for the DoD to begin thinking about and organizing a concerted and focused effort to prevent domestic violence.12

Domestic Homicides at Fort Bragg, North Carolina

The tragic domestic homicides at the U.S. Army post in Fort Bragg, N.C., in June and July of 2002 focused national attention on the DTFDV, reinforced the need for its work, and created a sense of urgency for a more concerted effort by the military to respond to victims of domestic violence and hold offenders accountable. That summer, five domestic homicides occurred at Fort Bragg:

- June 11—Sgt. 1st Class Rigoberto Nieves shot and killed his wife, Nancy, and then killed himself;
The War on Violence

- June 29—Master Sgt. William Wright allegedly strangled his wife, Jennifer;
- July 9—Sgt. Cedric Ramon allegedly stabbed his estranged wife, Marilyn, at least 50 times before setting her house on fire;
- July 19—Sgt. 1st Class Brandon Floyd shot and killed his wife and then killed himself;
- July 23—Joan Shannon allegedly shot and killed her husband, Major David Shannon, while he slept.13

In response to these homicides, the House Armed Services Committee conducted a hearing at Fort Bragg to identify problems with the military’s response to domestic violence. On Dec. 2, 2002, Congress passed the Armed Forces Domestic Security Act making civilian orders of protection valid on military installations.

The Armed Forces Domestic Security Act

The Armed Forces Domestic Security Act (HR 5590) provides that a civilian order of protection shall have the same force and effect on a military installation as it does within the jurisdiction of the court that issued the order. In addition, the Secretary of Defense is required to prescribe regulations to carry out this modification. In essence, the Armed Forces Domestic Security Act extends a form of full faith and credit to civilian orders of protection on military installations. At present, there is no charge for a violation of a protective order in the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Therefore, the extent of on-installation power in this regard is to enforce the provisions of the civilian order and turn the violation over to civilian authorities to prosecute. In contrast, military orders of protection have not been granted full faith and credit, or full force and effect on civilian land. Whether this is needed or not is still being debated.

U.S. Representative Robin Hayes (R-N.C.) sponsored the Armed Forces Domestic Security Act following the Congressional hearings at Fort Bragg in the summer of 2002. The Act passed in record time: it made it through both houses of Congress in the fall of 2002, gained President Bush’s signature in early December, and took immediate effect.

This legislation closed a loophole that had prevented civilian court orders—such as a restraining order against a batterer—from having any effect on domestic military installations. Before this legislation, victims of violence residing in military housing did not have access to a host of civilian legal tools.

For judges, this is a long-awaited recognition of their protective orders on military installations. To help facilitate this process and take advantage of the new law, judges should work with military commanders to establish a memorandum of understanding to ensure effective communication and to address the enforcement of their orders.

Fatality Reviews

While the DTFDV addressed the issue of fatality reviews in its first two reports,14 the homicides at Fort Bragg refocused attention on how they can be used to decrease the risks of future tragedies. The institution of fatality review teams, both in the Department of Defense and in each branch of the military, should prove to be an efficient means for periodically reviewing domestic violence policies and case management practices.

The DTFDV recommended the use of both installation- and DoD-wide fatality reviews and the involvement of civilians, including judges, law enforcement personnel, and prosecutors in the process. Not only should civilian representatives be involved in military fatality reviews, military commanders should be comparably involved in civilian fatality reviews, especially if the victim and/or perpetrator were military members. Findings from local installation fatality reviews should be forwarded to the DoD so that a military-wide examination can be conducted to determine the effectiveness of DoD policy, training, and implementation in the services and at local installations.

Coordinated Community Response

The DTFDV adopted the position that domestic violence is best dealt with by having a consistent, coordinated community response. This approach clearly communicates to potential offenders, as well as to those who have already offended, that domestic violence is not acceptable, will not be tolerated, and that there are consequences for such behavior. This consistent, coordinated approach easily adapts to the philosophy of the military community’s current response, in which the long-standing Family Advocacy Programs (whose purpose is to respond to child abuse and domestic violence incidents) reach out to professionals on installations to gather information and make recommendations to the military commanders.15 This approach will only be strengthened by using the Domestic Violence Intervention Process Model, the protocols, and involving
their counterpart agencies, including judges, from surrounding locales. In order to be most effective, however, every element of the response system—from law enforcement to medical to command—must follow the same protocol. It is important for everyone associated with the military to know what domestic violence is; the dynamics of domestic violence [see Appendix D—Military Power and Control Wheel], including risk factors; the effects on victims and on children who witness acts of domestic violence; and the consequences for offenders.

The DTFDV emphasized that collaborative efforts should be strengthened within the military, and also among the military and the civilian communities that surround military installations. The recommendations included seeking Memoranda of Understanding with local law enforcement agencies, shelters, court systems, and any other entities that can define specifically effective communication and cooperation in responding to domestic violence cases. While it is important and beneficial to establish Memoranda of Understanding between civilian agencies and military installations, more active involvement by installation commanders in local coordinated community efforts is also advisable. In communities with military installations nearby, existing domestic violence councils (or similar entities), should invite the installation commander to participate in these efforts, facilitating communications, increasing training, and improving responses in handling domestic violence victims and offenders.

A new project to improve coordination between civilian and military communities that is already underway is the military law enforcement Domestic Violence Train-the-Trainer Program. Working with the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center and the National Center on Domestic and Sexual Violence, the DoD’s Family Policy Office is conducting train-the-trainer programs across the country. These trainings involve military and civilian prosecutors, law enforcement officers, and advocates, and are geared to improving response, investigation, and coordination in domestic violence cases. Trainings have already been conducted in Fort Bragg, N.C., and Kings Bay Naval Station, Fla. Three additional trainings are scheduled for San Diego, Seattle, and Honolulu, by invitation of the host installations. More trainings will be scheduled in the future.

The National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges is implementing plans to undertake a similar effort to coordinate between local family and domestic violence courts and military installations. To this end, Council President James Ray has established a Military Relations sub-committee of the Family Violence Committee. The sub-committee will also explore opportunities for cross-training on domestic violence with installation commanders and Judge Advocates General (responsible for prosecuting offenders pursuant to the Uniform Code of Military Justice and advising commanders on proper courses of action), and will seek the appointment of a military liaison to the committee.

Summary of DTFDV

Initially, the DTFDV looked at the entire spectrum of domestic violence issues, including not only the military’s Family Advocacy Program, but also the roles of and responses from command, law enforcement, legal, medical, and faith communities. The DTFDV took a snapshot of what currently exists, in terms of domestic violence policy at the DoD level as well as domestic violence prevention and intervention practices at individual installations. At the DTFDV’s initial meeting in April 2000, information gathering was identified as the first step. The DTFDV then ranked the areas of concern and organized four standing workgroups: Community Collaboration, Education and Training, Offender Accountability, and Victim Safety. Ad hoc workgroups focused on special interest items such as defining domestic violence (the military still does not have a definition) and confidentiality. Currently, the military does not recognize confidentiality; any act of domestic violence is reported to command, regardless of the victim’s wishes. One of the DTFDV’s recommendations is adopting a policy of limited nondisclosure for victim advocates.

During its three years, the DTFDV met 15 times, with the workgroups meeting more frequently. During the first year, the DTFDV made site visits to installations representing each of the branches of the military in the continental United States. In the second year, site visits were also made to military installations in the European theater of operations (Germany and Italy) and the Pacific theater of operations (Hawaii, Japan, and Korea).

During the site visits, the DTFDV met with representatives of the military, including law enforcement, the Judge Advocate General’s office, victims, medical personnel, commanders, senior enlisted members, and many more, including civilian employees who had some involvement with domestic violence in the military.
Interviews were also conducted with corresponding entities from the civilian communities contiguous to the installations such as law enforcement personnel, domestic violence service providers, local prosecutors, and the judiciary. Prior to these interviews, participants were told that the discussion was not for attribution, so they would be forthright and candid.

During the third year, the DTFDV developed protocols and elements of the strategic plan. With the able support of the excellent staff, the DTFDV began to think into the future and urged the establishment of a core group that could provide consistent leadership after the Task Force expired. Robert Stein, Executive Director of the DTFDV, had delayed his retirement to manage this effort for DoD, and his contributions cannot be overly praised. To continue the DoD’s efforts in this area, the Office of Family Policy established an Implementation Team, tapping several DTFDV staff members and adding leadership from Michael Hoskins, who had worked closely with the DTFDV as the former Family Advocacy Program Director for the U.S. Navy. With their help in the transition phase, we can expect that many of the recommendations will be given every consideration by DoD and the military services. In addition, the DTFDV recommended that the DoD, “(w)ithin two years of receiving the final report, convene a small, independent group with a composition similar to the DTFDV to review, assess and report implementation progress to the Secretary of Defense.” Already the Implementation Team has put forward the confidentiality policy for advocates and several other key point recommendations for review and comment among the military services and eventual policy adoptions by the DoD.

The DTFDV understood that, in making more than 200 specific recommendations, some of them would not be implemented for various financial, institutional, and even political reasons. The civilian members, especially, came to realize that, at some point, they had to trust in the military’s leadership and how the military operates. Word from the top in the military’s regimented and hierarchical society has dramatic impact. The DTFDV’s military members believe significant change will occur as awareness grows in the services and in the DoD. The DTFDV believes that the implementation of a majority of the recommendations, at least those that involve the strategic plan, will prove to dramatically reduce the level of domestic violence in the military. The means of combating domestic violence in the United States Armed Forces could very well become a model for civilian communities to consider as they too seek to end violence against women.

Growing out of the DTFDV’s recommendations, The Military Response to Domestic Violence: Tools for Civilian Advocates is a guide specifically designed to help advocates support military victims of domestic violence. It was written by Judith E. Beals, J.D., a member of the DTFDV, published by the Battered Women’s Justice Project and is available online at www.bwjp.org.

Authors’ Addresses:

Judge Peter C. Macdonald  
316 James Lyn Drive  
Hopkinsville, KY 42240

Deborah D. Tucker, M.A.  
National Center on Domestic and Sexual Violence  
7800 Shoal Creek Blvd., Suite 120-N  
Austin, TX 78757  
http://www.ncdsv.org
APPENDIX A

DEFENSE TASK FORCE ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

For complete bios on each Task Force member visit: http://www.dtic.mil/domesticviolence/

Co-Chairs

Lieutenant General Garry L. Parks, USMC, Deputy Commander for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington, DC

Deborah D. Tucker, Executive Director, National Center on Domestic and Sexual Violence, Austin, TX

Members

Sgt. Louis J. Armijo, Police Department, Property Section, Albuquerque, NM (former member)

Judith Beals, Consultant, Boston, MA (formerly director of Jane Doe, Inc., the Massachusetts Coalition Against Domestic and Sexual Violence)

Rear Admiral Annette E. Brown, USN, Commander, Navy Region Southeast, Jacksonville, FL

Jacquelyn C. Campbell, Ph.D., R.N., FAAN, Anna D. Wolf Endowed Professor and Associate Dean for Faculty Affairs, Johns Hopkins University School of Nursing, Baltimore, MD

Vickii P. Coffey, President, Vickii Coffey and Associates, Inc., Olympia Fields, IL

Brigadier General Joseph Composto, USMC, Commanding General, U.S. Marine Corps Base, Quantico, VA

Elizabeth T. Corliss, Federal Executive Institute, Charlottesville, VA

Brigadier General Jan D. Eakle, USAF, Vice Commander, Ogden Air Logistics Center, Hill Air Force Base, UT


Reverend (Dr.) Marie M. Fortune, Center for Prevention of Sexual and Domestic Violence, Seattle, WA

Mr. Casey G. Gwinn, City Attorney, San Diego, CA

Brigadier General Leif H. Hendrickson, USMC, Office of the Deputy Commandant for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Quantico, VA

Rear Admiral Steven Horton (Ret.), Boeing Company, Space and Communications Groups, Seal Beach, CA (former member)

Jackson Katz, President, MVP Strategies, Long Beach, CA

Lieutenant General Jack Klimp, USMC (Ret.), Mount Kisco, NY (former co-chair)

Ms. Jeannie E. Koss, Soldier and Family Readiness Program Manager, Army Community Services, Fort Carson, CO (former member)

Michael P. LaRiviere, Police Department, Salem, MA

Honorable Peter Macdonald, District Judge, 3rd Judicial District of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, Hopkinsville, KY

Beckie U. Masaki, Asian Women’s Shelter, San Francisco, CA

John F. McEleny, Deputy Director, Naval Criminal Investigative Service, Washington, DC

Sergeant Major Alford L. McMichael, USMC, Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps, Washington, DC

Captain James B. Norman, USN, Commanding Officer, Naval Legal Service Office, North Central, Washington, DC

Catherine Pierce, Office on Violence Against Women, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC


Major General Thomas J. Romig, USA, The Judge Advocate General, U.S. Army, Washington, DC

Lieutenant General Edward Soriano, Commanding General, Fort Lewis, WA (former member)

Connie Sponsler-Garcia, Battered Women’s Justice Project, Minneapolis, MN

Major General Antonio M. Taguba, USA, Acting Director of the Army Staff, Washington, DC

Major General Craig Whelden, Deputy Commanding General, U.S. Army Pacific, Fort Shafter, HI
APPENDIX A (CONT.)

DEFENSE TASK FORCE ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

Staff

Robert L. Stein, III, Executive Director
Captain Glenna L. Tinney, USN, Deputy Executive Director
Sergeant First Class Teresa Beauchamp, USA, Administrative Noncommissioned Officer
Valinda Bolton, Training Director, National Center on Domestic and Sexual Violence, Austin, TX
Joan M. Byrd, Administrative Assistant

Lieutenant Colonel James N. Jackson, USA, Workgroup Leader

Lieutenant Colonel Sarah Elizabeth Moore, USAF, Workgroup Leader
Bernard R. Robinson, Management Support Officer
Michael J. Shane, Senior Consultant
Chief Master Sergeant Earl Taylor, USAF, Senior Enlisted Advisor and Assistant Workgroup Leader
Lonnie Weiss, Weiss Consulting, Philadelphia, PA (consultant)
Major Michael Zeliff, USMC, Workgroup Leader
APPENDIX B
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE INTERVENTION PROCESS MODEL

**DV Incident**
Report may come from one/more sources (victim, FAP, chaplain, medical, civilian law enforcement, 3rd party, etc.) and may enter model through one/more protocol(s) below.

- Victim Advocate Protocol
- Command Protocol
- Law Enforcement Protocol
- Initial Command Investigation
- DVAIT Assessment and Recommendations
- Offender Intervention
- UCMJ Action/No UCMJ Action
- Admin Action/No Admin Action
- Offender Intervention Protocol

*Take into consideration information and assessment from FAP, law enforcement, SJA, victim advocate, medical, clergy, etc., as appropriate.

**Multiple options may be chosen and some/all actions may occur simultaneously.

--- Dotted line connotes transfer of information only if nondisclosure is waived.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Color Key</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Victim</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX C

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PREVENTION CONCEPTUAL MODEL

**Toolkit**

- Separate from Military and/or Disciplinary Action As Appropriate
- Urgent Danger Assessment & Safety Planning

- Risk & Danger Assessment
- Safety Planning
- Victim Advocacy
- FAP Assessment
- Offender Intervention Program
- Administrative and/or Disciplinary Action As Appropriate
- Child Witness Program
- First Offense Programs

**Groups at Risk**

- Substance Abuse
- ADM w/PTSD
- Couples with Problems
- Child Witnesses
- Child Abuse History
- Immigrant Spouses
- Pregnant Women
- Controlling Spouses
- History of Violence Against Anyone

- Couples Counseling
- Targeted Programs
- New Parent Support
- Child Witness Programs
- Health Care Screening

**Primary Prevention**

- Everyone

**Secondary Prevention**

- Low Risk**

- Moderate Risk**

- High Risk**

**Tertiary Prevention**

- Risk for reoccurrence and danger/lethality

*Not all inclusive

**Risk for reoccurrence and danger/lethality
APPENDIX D

MILITARY POWER AND CONTROL WHEEL

USING COERCION AND THREATS:
Telling her, “If you report me, you’ll lose your income, base housing, the kids, be deported. Threatening her with firearms. Saying, “Do what I tell you or I’ll get you.”

USING INTIMIDATION:
Telling her you’re trained to kill and maim. Controlling her with stares, looks, and gestures. Playing with or cleaning your weapons around her. Hurting pets. Destroying her property.

USING EMOTIONAL ABUSE:
Ignoring her when you return from work or deployment. Trivializing her concerns. Telling her people think she’s crazy. Telling her she’s a bad wife, mother, lover. Putting her down publicly. Accusing her of ruining your career.

USING ISOLATION:
Controlling access to her military I.D. card, family, friends, information, base/command functions, telephone, transportation, or English lessons. Living off-base to lessen her contact with others.

USING CHILDREN:
Refusing to help with the child(ren). Threatening to get custody. Telling the child(ren) she’s a bad mother. Getting the child(ren) to disrespect her. Threatening to hurt the child(ren) if she doesn’t comply.

USING CHILDREN:
Refusing to help with the child(ren). Threatening to get custody. Telling the child(ren) she’s a bad mother. Getting the child(ren) to disrespect her. Threatening to hurt the child(ren) if she doesn’t comply.

USING ECONOMIC ABUSE:
Leaving no allotments during deployment. Not sharing pay or financial records. Telling her what she can buy. Preventing her from getting a checking account, credit cards, a job, or schooling.

USING MILITARY/MALE PRIVILEGE:
Using her dependent wife status or cultural/religious traditions to keep her in line. Keeping all legal documents in your name. Saying you’re the CO and the family is your troops. Taking over as head of the household post-deployment.

MINIMIZING, DENYING, AND BLAMING:
Saying she’s lying to “get” you. Claiming she provoked it by playing around, getting drunk, not shutting up, or not doing what you told her. Blaming the violence on job stress or alcohol.

CLAIMING MILITARY/MALE PRIVILEGE:
Using her dependent wife status or cultural/religious traditions to keep her in line. Keeping all legal documents in your name. Saying you’re the CO and the family is your troops. Taking over as head of the household post-deployment.

VIOLENCE

physical

sexual

Developed from:
Domestic Abuse Intervention Project
205 West 4th Street
Duluth, MN 55805
218.722.4134

Produced and distributed by:
NATIONAL CENTER
on Domestic and Sexual Violence
training ¥ consulting ¥ advocate
7800 Shoal Creek, Ste 120-A ¥ Austin Texas 78758
The War on Violence

END NOTES

1 Judith E. Beals, The Military Response to Domestic Violence Tools for Civilian Advocates, (2003). See also id. at Appendix, Memorandum from Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz to secretaries of the military departments (Nov. 19, 2001) (citing that in Fiscal Year 2000, more than 10,500 physical and/or sexual assaults of a spouse were substantiated in the Department of Defense Family Advocacy Program, with more than 5,200 active duty personnel identified as the alleged perpetrators).


6 Beals, supra note 1.


8 Id.

9 All three reports may be viewed online at the DTFDV’s Web site at http://www.dtic.mil/domesticviolence.

10 Third Year Report, supra note 4, at 21.

11 Id. at viii.

12 Id. at x.


14 Initial Report, supra note 3, at 57-58, and at 82-83, at http://www.dtic.mil/domesticviolence/reports/DV_RPT2.PDF

15 Initial Report, supra note 3, at 87-90, which also includes other military preventive efforts.


17 Third Year Report, supra note 4, at xiv.